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Abstract
In their inuential paper, Aghion and Bolton (1987) argue that a
buyer and a seller may agree on high liquidation damages in order to
extract rents from future suppliers. As this may distort future trade,
it may be socially wasteful.
We argue that Aghion and Boltonsanalysis of entry is incomplete
in some respects, as there is only one potential entrant in their model.
We construct a model with many potential entrants. Entry is costly,
so entering suppliers have to earn a quasi-rent in order to recoup
their entry costs. Reducing the entrants prots by the help of a
breach penalty reduces the probability of entry, and this reduces the
attractiveness of breach penalties for the contracting parties.
We show that the initial buyer and seller only have incentives to
include a positive breach penalty if there is excessive entry without it,
in which case the breach penalty is welfare improving.
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1 Introduction
In their inuential paper, Aghion and Bolton (1987) argue that a buyer and
a seller may have incentives to use partly exclusive contracts in a way that
harms welfare. They show that liquidation damages awarded to the seller in
the event of breach of contract by the buyer (hereafter breach penalties) may
be used to extract rents from future suppliers entering the market at a later
stage. As a by-product of rent extraction, the most e¢ cient supplier is not
always chosen, thus harming economic e¢ ciency.
Aghion and Boltonsinsights have been highly inuential and widely ap-
plied. Their ndings appear in leading textbooks (Church and Ware 2000,
Motta 2004, Pepall, Richards and Norman 2002) as well as in policy analyses.
In the ongoing debate surrounding EUs article 82 on dominance, the paper
plays a key role. For instance, in a report on Article 82 prepared by the
prestigious Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy in EU (anti-
trust group) concerning article 82 (Gual et al 2005), one reads (with explicit
reference to Aghion and Bolton):
"For example, an exclusive dealing contract that makes entry more di¢ -
cult may be used to extract rents from a potential entrant."
Regarding rebates, the report continues:
"Thus, the rebate is analogous to a penalty paid by the entrant; it plays
the role of an entry fee, designed to extract some of the e¢ ciency gains of
new entrants, and by the same token it creates a barrier to entry".
In this paper we argue that Aghion and Boltons analysis of entry is
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incomplete in some respects, as they only allow for one potential entrant,
whos cost structure is exogenous (independent of the breach penalty). By
contrast, in our model there are many potential entrants. The probability of
entry as well as the cost distribution of the preferred entrant (if more than
one) depend on the contract chosen by the initial buyer and seller. We nd
that this dramatically changes the results of the analysis. Under reasonable
assumptions, the initial buyer and seller set a positive breach penalty if and
only if this is (constrained) e¢ cient. If a regulator excludes the use of breach
penalty, welfare is reduced.
We model entry as follows: There is a sunk cost associated with entry.
The production cost for a given supplier is stochastic at the entry stage,
and realized after the entry cost is incurred. In the equilibrium of the entry
game, the expected quazi-rent for an entrant exactly equals the entry cost.
Reducing entrantsquazi-prots by a breach penalty reduces the number of
entrants, and this reduces the attractiveness of breach penalties. We show
that with Bertrand competition between the suppliers ex post, the optimal
breach penalty is zero. If the return to entrants exceed (fall short of) the
return under Bertrand competition, there will be excessive (insu¢ cient) entry
in the absence of a breach penalty, and a strictly positive (negative) breach
penalty is called for by the initial buyer and seller. In all cases, the breach
penalty is constrained e¢ cient.
Our results hinge on the assumption that there are more than one po-
tential entrant at the contracting stage, and that these potential entrants
are ex ante identical. We nd this consistent with the assumption that the
entrants are not present at the contracting stage, and at this point have no
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vested interests in the project. If they had vested interests at this stage,
they would approach the contracting buyer and seller and made their inter-
ests heard at the time when the contract was negotiated. This anonymity
indicates that there are many potential entrants, and that none of them are
identied as having a unique productivity advantage in this particular re-
lationship. Quasi-rents and the relationship-specic productivity associated
with this particular delivery must be attributed to investments undertaken
after the contract between the initial buyer and seller is signed.
Our insights also apply if the initial seller undertakes investments. Spier
and Whinston (1995) argue the initial buyer and seller may have a common
incentive to over-invest in cost-reducing technology, in order to extract rents
from the entrants. With endogenous entry this is no longer the case, as
over-investments also reduce the entry of new suppliers.
We argue that a breach penalty in a contractual setting is analogous
to a reservation price above the sellers valuation in an auction. With an
exogenous number of participants, it is optimal to set the reservation price
above the sellers evaluation. If there is competition between auctions this
may no longer be the case, and it is usually optimal to set the reservation
price equal to the sellers valuation, see for instance McA¤ee (1993), Levin
and Smith (1994), and Peters (1997). Our contribution is to bring these
insights from auction theory into the eld of exclusive dealing and breach
penalties.
A number of studies discuss breach penalties as a remedy for rent extrac-
tion, and how this may give rise to an ine¢ cient allocation of resources. A
seminal paper (in addition to Aghion and Bolton) is Diamond and Maskin
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(1977), who analyze breach penalties in a search context. A third important
paper is Rasmussen et al (1991) who show that if there are many buyers that
cannot coordinate their actions, a seller can bribe some of them to write an
exclusive contract and thereby prevent entry (see also Whinston 2000). Fu-
magalli and Motta (2006) show that naked exclusion cannot be a protable
strategy if the buyers dont have market power in the market for their nal
product.
Innes and Sexton (1994) argue that a breach penalty may be warranted
if the buyer and the entrant collude against the initial supplier. Marx and
Sha¤er (1999) consider a retailer monopolist negotiating sequentially with
two suppliers. If the initial contract species a price below marginal costs,
this may a¤ect the bargaining game with the second supplier and enables the
monopolist to extract more of the second suppliers rents. Marx and Sha¤er
(2007) argue that upfront payments may be used as an exclusion devise in
downstream markets.
To our knowledge there are no papers that explicitly model entry in the
Aghion-Bolton model. Spier and Whinston (op.cit.) argue that with perfect
competition among entrants, the initial buyer and seller have no incentives to
set a breach penalty. However, in their model, that is simply because there
are no rents to extract from the suppliers. In our model, by contrast, there
are rents to extract, but it may not be in the buyers and sellers interest to
do so.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we set up the
model. Then we show that with Bertrand competition, a breach penalty is
protable with exogenous entry but not with endogenous entry. In section 3
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we derive similar results for cost-reducing investments. In section 4 we show
that a positive (negative) breach penalty is warranted if the entrants earn
excessive (insu¢ cient) quazi-rents after entry. In the last section we o¤er
some concluding remarks.
2 The model
Our starting point is a buyer and a seller who have met eachother in the
market, and who may enjoy a rent (posibly a quazi-rent) by trading. The
buyer demands one unit of an indivisible good, and has a willingness to pay
for this good equal to 1. A seller can supply the good at cost c < 1. The
buyer and the seller writes a contract under full information. We refer to the
buyer and the seller as the incumbent agents, and the contract as the initial
contract. Before trade takes place, new suppliers may enter the market and
replace the incumbent seller.
The initial contract is of the form (P 0; P ; B), where P 0 denotes a "sign-
on fee" paid by the buyer to the seller, P  denotes payment from the buyer
to the seller at delivery, and B denotes a breach penalty paid by the buyer
to the seller if the buyer switches to a new supplier. The initial contract
maximizes the incumbent agents joint expected surplus. Without loss of
generality we assume that P  = c. The up-front payment P 0 can be used to
share the surplus between the buyer and the seller so that P  is superuous.
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. B and S agree on the contract.
2. A xed number N of potential entrants independently and simultane-
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ously consider whether they will enter the market.
3. There is a sunk cost k associated with entering the market.
4. After the sunk cost is incurred, production cost c is realized. The cost
c is drawn from a continuous distribution function F , with density f .
5. The entrants (if any) make price o¤ers to the buyer. The buyer chooses
the supplier that o¤ers the lowest price (including the breach penalty).
6. Trade takes place.
We study a symmetric equilibrium in which all rms enter the market
with equal probability q. The number of entrants is thus binomially distrib-
uted with parameters (N; q). The expected number of entrants is  = Nq. A
higher value of  is thus associated with more entry. Note that as N !1,
the distribution of the number of entrants converges to the Poisson distrib-
ution with parameter .
We rst study Bertrand competition. If there is only one entrant, it
obtains a prot of max[c   B   ci; 0], where ci is the realized cost. If more
than one rm enter, the prot of entrant i is strictly positive only if its cost
is strictly lower than the other entrantscosts, and in addition c   B > ci.
In this event, the rms prot is min[c B; c i]  ci, where c i is the lowest
cost among the other entrants.1
1Note is that it is not crucial that the entrants observe each others costs, as long as the
distribution of costs is drawn from the same distribution for all the entrants. Suppose rms
have private information about their costs, and submit bids as in a rst price auction. Then
we know from the revenue equivalence theorem that the allocation and expected prots
will be the same as with Bertrand competition.
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Let PN(c) denote the probability that an entrant with costs lower than
c appears given N and q (we depress the dependence on q). It follows that
PN(c) = 1   [1   qF (c)]N , which is increasing in q for all c. For a given
rm that enters, the probability that it will meet another entrant with costs
below c is PN 1(c).2 Let pN and pN 1 denote the respective densities. The




(c  ci)pN 1(c)dc+ (1  PN 1(c  B))(c  B   ci)





(1  PN 1(c))F (c)dc (1)
Since PN 1 is increasing in q for all c, it follows that  is decreasing in q,
and hence also in  (more competitors hurt prots). Below it is convenient
to write  as a function of  and B. Then the partial derivative  < 0.
We also write PN and pN as functions of , pN(c; ) and PN(c; ), but take
us the liberty to suppress the dependence on  whenever that is convenient.
2.1 Exogenous entry
We rst study the model when entry, represented by the parameter  = Nq,
is considered exogenous by B and S. This is analogous with Aghion and
Boltons assumption that the distribution of the entrants costs is exogenous.
The buyer and the seller choose the breach penalty B so as to maximize
expected joint prots. Let W I(B; ) denote the sum of the initial agents
2As N !1, PN (c) = PN 1(c) = P (c), where P (c) = 1  e F (c).
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expected prots, WE(B; ) the expected gross prot for all the entrants
(entry costs not subtracted), and W (B; ) = W I +WE the sum of all the
rmsexpected gross prots. Then
W (B; ) = 1  c +
Z c B
0
(c   c)pN(c ; )dc (2)
It is easy to show that WE = , where  is given by (1).3 The incumbent
agents set B so as to maximize W I(B; ) =W (B; ) WE(B; ), treating 
as exogenous. The rst order condition for maximum is thus thatWB WEB =
0, (where footscript B denotes partial derivative with respect to B) or from
(2) and (1),
 BpN(c  B) + (1  PN 1(c  B))F (c  B) = 0
The rst term represents the e¤ect of B on W . Obviously, W is maximized
for B = 0. The second term represents rent extraction, as the breach penalty
transfers prots from the entrants to the incumbents. The optimal breach




As in Aghion and Bolton, the incumbent agents set a strictly positive
breach penalty. This is harmful to welfare but protable to the incumbents
as the breach penalty shifts prots from the entrants to the incumbents.
3Expected gross prot is Ni=1q = Nq = .
4The second order conditions are satised if the rate F=f is increasing in c, and this
corresponds to the standard hazard rate assumptions in the literature on optimal contracts.
See for instance La¤ont and Tirole (1993).
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2.2 Endogenous entry
Equilibrium in the entry game requires that  = k. Thus, for any given B,
(1) denes  as a function of B,  = (B) (since PN 1 is a function of ).
Note that 0(B) < 0. AsW I is increasing in , it follows that the incumbents
are more reluctant to increase the breach penalty when they realize that this
will inuence the entry decisions of suppliers.
In the appendix we show that in the absence of breach penalties, the
social and the private value of entry coincide:
Lemma 1 With Bertrand competition and no breach penalty, W = .
The surplus of the initial agents is W I = W (B; )  (B)k, and the rst
order condition for maximum can be written as
WB + 
0(B)(W   k) = 0
At B = 0, WB = 0, and from lemma (1) it thus follows that the rst order
conditions are satised at B = 0. Furthermore, as the derivative is strictly
positive for all B < 0 and strictly negative for all B > 0, it follows that
B = 0 uniquely maximizes W I .
A planner maximizes aggregate prots less entry costs. Since B = 0 both
imply optimal entry and optimal allocation of production on rms, B = 0 is
socially optimal.
Proposition 1 With endogenous entry and Bertrand competition, the in-
cumbents maximize prot by setting the breach penalty equal to zero. This is
also socially optimal.
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When the breach penalty is zero, an entrant is paid exactly its marginal
contribution to aggregate prots. That is, the entire cost advantage c   ci
if it is the only rm that enters, its cost advantage c i   ci over the other
entrants with costs below c if it is the most e¢ cient rm that enters, and
zero otherwise. This ensures that the optimal number of suppliers enter the
market. Furthermore, as all the entrants are on their participation constraint,
all prots less entrance costs are allocated to the incumbents.5
3 Investments by the incumbent seller
Spier and Whinston (1995) show that, in the presence of renegotiation be-
tween the incumbent buyer and seller, breach penalties have no bite. They
further argue that cost-reducing investments by the initial seller may act as
a substitute for breach-penalties, as lower costs reduce the price the buyer
has to pay if a more e¢ cient supplier enters. The initial seller will therefore
over-invest.6
Suppose the sellerscosts c depend on investments i undertaken by the
seller, so that c = c(i). We assume that i is chosen so as to maximize
joint prots. We follow Spier and Whinston and rule out breach penalties.
Aggregate gross prots can then be written
W (i; ) = 1  c(i) +
Z c(i)
0
(c(i)  c)pN(c; )dc (4)
5This e¢ ciency result corresponds to the so-called Mortensen rule for e¢ ciency in
matching models, see Mortensen (1982) and Julien, Kennes and King (2004).
6Their result resemblances ndings in the auction literature regarding the sellers prob-
lem to commit to a reservation price (Burguet and Sakovics 1996).
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Suppose rst that the initial buyer and seller treat the amount of entry,
dened by , as exogenous. The incumbents choose i so as to maximize
W I   i = W   WE   i. From (1) and (4) it follows that the rst order
condition can be written as
dW I
di
=  (1  PN(c))c0(i)  [1  PN 1(c)]F (c)c0(i) = 1 (5)
The rst term reects the social gain from investments: with probability (1 
PN) the incumbent supplier produces the good, in which case the investments
reduce costs by  c0(i) units. The second term reects rent extraction. With
probability (1   PN 1(c))F (c) exactly one incumbent with lower costs
than c enters, and in this case the price falls by  c0(i) units.
Suppose then instead that the initial agents take into account that 
depends on c in such a way that the zero prot condition holds. It follows
from the free entry condition that we can write  = (i). The incumbents
choose i so as to maximize
W I(i; (i))  i = W (i; (i))  (i)k   i
with rst order condition
 (1  PN(c))c0(i) + 0(i)[W   k] = 1
From lemma 1 it follows that the last term is zero. Thus the rst order
condition simplies to  (1   PN(c))c0(i) = 1, which is also the rst order
condition to the planners maximization problem.
Proposition 2 Suppose the initial supplier can undertake cost-reducing in-
vestments. With free entry, the incumbent buyer and seller will choose the
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socially optimal (rst best) investment level.
The intuition is exactly the same as for our earlier e¢ ciency results. The
initial agents have the opportunity to extract rents from the entrants. How-
ever, they do not have an incentive to do so, as this will reduce the amount
of entry.
4 Non-zero breach penalties
In this subsection we show that if prices are not set in a Bertrand fashion,
entry will not be optimal, and this may call for breach penalties (positive or
negative).
In some markets there may be too much entry. As an example, suppose
entrants who do not have the lowest costs withdraw from the market without
submitting bids. This is a weakly dominant strategy for the entrant. At the
same time, this increases the prots of entering the market dramatically;
without a breach penalty, the entire surplus created by entry is allocated to
the entrants. Since the entrants obtain zero prot, this surplus is spent on
entry costs. Aggregate net prots (entry costs subtracted) is thus reduced to
1  c, i.e., the same as if there had been no entry at all! This is clearly not
optimal. Similar (but weaker) e¤ects may also occur if the agents bargain
over the price and the competing agents have left the scene when bargaining
takes place. We may also have too much entry for other reasons. In our
concluding remarks we argue that rent seeking may lead to excessive entry.
In other situations there may be insu¢ cient entry. Suppose the buyer
has a downward sloping demand curve D(p), and that the suppliers only use
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linear prices. If more than one rm enters with lower costs than c, entry
will reduce prices, and demand will expand. As a result, the social value of
entry may exceed the private value to the entrants.
Without specifying the competition regime, let e(;B) denote a reduced-
form expected prot function to an entrant, showing the expected quazi-rent
when entering the market. As above, let (;B) denote the expected quazi-
rent to an entrant under Bertrand competition (given by equation 1).
We say that we have excessive compensation to entrants whenever e(B; ) >
(B; ). Analogously, we have insu¢ cient compensation to entrants when-
ever e(B; ) < (B; ). We assume that the di¤erent competition regimes
give rise to the same aggregate prots W (B; ). This is true if, in all com-
petition regimes, the entrant with the lowest cost is chosen provided that its
costs are lower than c  B. We say that a breach penalty B is constrained
e¢ cient if the planner, if she could choose the breach penalty but nothing
else, would set B = B.
As before, the incumbent rm maximizesW (B; (B)) (B)k, with rst
order condition
WB   0(B)[W   k] = 0
At B = 0 the rst term is zero. It thus follows that the incumbents set
a strictly positive (negative) breach penalty whenever W((0); 0) is strictly
lower (higher) than the entry cost k. Recall from Lemma 1 thatW = k with
Bertrand competition. Thus the incumbents set a strictly positive breach
penalty if there is excessive compensation to the entrants, and a strictly
negative breach penalty if there is insu¢ cient compensation to entrants.
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Finally, the constrained e¢ cient solution maximizes net prots W   k,
which is the same as maximizing W I . It thus follows that the incumbents
choice of breach penalty is constrained e¢ cient:
Proposition 3 The incumbents set a strictly positive breach penalty if there
is excessive compensation to the entrants, and a strictly negative breach
penalty if there is insu¢ cient compensation to entrants. In both cases, the
incumbents choose the constrained e¢ cient breach penalty.
To understand why the breach penalty is constrained e¢ cient, note that
there are no externalities in the model. Increasing B does not reduce the ex
ante prot of the entrants, which is zero anyway. It follows that the interests
of the incumbent agents and of the planner are aligned.
Although the breach penalty enhances e¢ ciency, rst best cannot be
achieved. This is because reducing entry by a breach penalty comes at a
cost, as it distorts ex post e¢ ciency.7
5 Concluding remarks
We have discussed the extent to which an incumbent buyer and seller have
incentives to extract rents from entering suppliers by using a breach penalty.
We argue that as long as the entrants obtain zero prots ex ante, and there
is Bertrand competition between the suppliers ex post, the optimal breach
penalty is zero. A positive (negative) breach penalty will only be protable
to the incumbents if the entrants have too strong (weak) incentives to enter.
7First best may be obtained if we allow for entry fees.
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Even in this case, the breach penalty that maximizes prots is constrained
e¢ cient.
We conjecture that rent extraction in general is less attractive when entry
is taken into account, and that the social and the private incentives to extract
rents from the entrants generally coincide as long as the entrants obtain zero
prots.
For instance, Bernheim and Whinston (1998) model a more complex en-
vironment, where one buyer and two sellers are present at the contracting
stage. Later on, a new buyer may arrive. Bernheim and Whinston show
that the initial agentsjoint prot may be maximized if one of the sellers is
excluded from the market, as this will reduce the competition for delivery
to the entering buyer. With endogenous entry of new buyers, such rent ex-
traction will reduce the probability of entry. We conjecture that when the
incumbent buyer and seller take entry into account, the incentive to exclude
one of the sellers will be eliminated.
Our critical assumption is that all entrants obtain zero prots. This may
not be the case in entry games with a more coordinated structure. Suppose
for instance that rms enter sequentially. The rst rms that enter will
then have an advantage over rms that enter at a later stage, and obtain
positive expected prots. This opens up for protable rent extraction by
the incumbents. Note the resemblance to the auction literature, where it is
shown that the integer problem may make it optimal to set a positive breach
penalty (see for instance Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1993).
However, an unattractive feature of sequential entry as described above
is that an important ingredient, the sequence in which rms enter, is not
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modelled. Furthermore, ex ante identical suppliers obtain di¤erent ex ante
prots. Presumably suppliers would engage in activities that would enhance
their prospects of being the rst rm to enter.
We will discuss the latter point in more detail. Suppose the entrants, by
incurring a cost (e¤ort) r, may improve their chances of entering rst. This
may for instance reect that an entrant may use resources to speed up the
entry process. Assume that r does not create social value, i.e., is a complete
waste. Potential entrants choose r simultaneously and independently, and
the sequence at which they enter equals their ranking of their e¤ort r. This
pre-entry game is a tournament (all pay auction), possibly with several prices.
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Clark and Riis (1998), or Klemperer (2004)
for a survey.
There is no pure strategy equilibrium in this tournament. However, one
can easily show that in any equilibrium, all participants obtain zero prots.
Thus, the aggregate e¤ort is exactly equal to the net expected prot when
entering the market. As a result, (ex ante) prots to the entering rms have
no social value, as this will be dissipated in the pre-entry game anyway.
When the incumbent agents set the breach penalty, they trade o¤ rent
extraction from the entrants and ex post e¢ cient trade, and when doing so
they do not put any weight on rents to the entrant. However, rent to the
entrant has no social value, as it is dissipated in the pre-entry game. The
planner thus faces exactly the same trade-o¤ as the incumbent agents when
setting the breach penalty, and the breach penalty is constrained e¢ cient.
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6 Appendix
Derivation of equation (1)




(c  ci)pN 1(c)dc+ (1  PN 1(c  B))(c  B   ci)






















where we again have used integration by parts.
Proof of Lemma 1




(c   c)[(1  qF (c))N 1f(c)  (N   1)(1  qF (c))N 2F (c)f(c)q]dc
= jc0 (c   c)(1  qF (c))N 1F (c) +
Z c
0




(1  PN 1(c))F (c)dc = 
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